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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

t

Plaintiff-Respondent, :

Case No. 880650-CA

v.
RUEBEN ROSS,

:

Defendant-Appelant

Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of forgery, a felony
in the second degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-501
(Supp. 1988), following a jury trial in Third District Court, in
and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable John A. Rokich, judge,
presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. $ 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(e) (1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court properly admitted evidence

of defendant's prior attempted forgery conviction under Utah R.
Evid. 609 to impeach his credibility.
2.

Whether a statement of the prosecutor, in which she

asked for a recess to allow the witness to compose herself and
mentioned that the witness had had a death in the family, was
improper and so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.
3.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict

defendant of forgery*

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-501 (Supp. 1988):
Forgery - "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if,
with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to
be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) Alters any writing of another
without his authority or utters any such
altered writing; or
(b) Makes, completes, executes,
authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes,
or utters any writing so that the writing or
the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference,
publication or utterance purports to be the
act of another, whether the person is
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have
been executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact the
case, or to be a copy of an original when no
such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing"
includes printing or any other method of
recording information, checks, tokens,
stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of
value, right, privilege, or identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second
degree if the writing is or purports to be:
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any
other instrument or writing issued by the
government, or any agency thereof; or
(b) A check with a face amount of $100
or more, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any
other instrument or writing representing an
interest in or claim against property, or a
pecuniary interest in or claim against any
person or enterprise.
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third
degree if the writing is or purports to be a
check with a face amount of less than $100,
all other forgery is a class A misdemeanor.
Utah R. Evid. 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

Utah R. Evid. 609:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him
or established by public record during crossexamination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction
under this rule is not admissible if a period
of more than ten years has elapsed since the
date of the conviction or of the release of
the witness from the confinement imposed for
that conviction, whichever is the later date,
unless the court determines, in the interests
of justice, that the probative value of the
conviction supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a
conviction more than ten years old as
calculated herein, is not admissible unless
the proponent gives to the adverse party with
a fair opportunity to contest the use of such
evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or
certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a
conviction is not admissible under this rule
if (1) the conviction has been the subject of
a pardon, annulment, certificate of
rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure
based on a finding of the rehabilitation of
the person convicted, and that person has not
been convicted os a subsequent crime which
was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has
been the subject or a pardon, annulment, or
other equivalent procedure based on a finding
of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of
juvenile adjudications is generally not
admissible under this rule. The court may,
however, in a criminal case allow evidence of
a juvenile adjudication of a witness other
•3-

than the accused if conviction of the offense
would be admissible to attack the credibility
of an adult and the court is satisfied that
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair
determination of the issue of guilty or
innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of
an appeal therefrom does not render evidence
of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of
the pendency of an appeal is admissible.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Rueben Ross, was convicted of forgery in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1988), a felony of
the second degree, following a jury trial in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

He

was sentenced to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for a term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about July 8, 1988, a checkbook was taken from
the desk of James Quigley, located in his office at 1750
University Club Building (T. 4-6). The checks were drawn on the
trust account of James and Anne Quigley (T. 24, 91).
On July 9, 1988, the defendant met Jeannie Hunter at a
convenience store.

Ms. Hunter aggreed to give defendant a ride

to a liquor store in return for gas money (T. 14). After going
to the liquor store (T. 18-19, 90), defendant did not have the
money to pay Ms. Hunter for gas, and requested her assistance in
helping him cash a check, which he claimed was from his
grandmother (T. 19, 90). Ms. Hunter told defendant that she only
had one form of I.D. and that it would be difficult to cash the
two-party check.

Defendant told Ms. Hunter that Check Mart would

cash a check with no identification (T. 20). Defendant led Ms.
Hunter to a house (T. 21, 91), where he procured a check, drawn
on the account of James and Anne Quigley, made out to Ms. Hunter
for two hundred dollars (T. 24, 91).
Ms. Hunter and defendant drove to Check Mart.

As they

were entering the building, defendant suggested that Ms. Hunter
tell the teller that the check was from Ms. Hunter's grandmother
(T. 27). Ms. Hunter presented the check, and the teller had Ms.
Hunter endorse and place a thumbprint on the back of the check
(T. 76). When asked who the check was from, defendant responded
"our grandmother"

T. 78, 103). When it was pointed out, because

of the obvious racial difference between Ms. Hunter and
defendant, that this was biologically unlikely, Ms. Hunter told
the teller that it was from her grandmother (T. 78).
The teller suspected the check was a forgery and
contacted the police (T. 78). When the police entered the
building they saw defendant look over his shoulder at them, and
try to hide something in the waistband of his pants (T. 110).
Police frisked the defendant and found the checkbook stolen from
the Quigley's in the waistband of his pants (T. 111).
Defendant's testimony contradicted that of Ms. Hunter.
He claims that he met Ms. Hunter at the convenience store and
offered to pay her gas money if she would take him to pick up his
paycheck (T. 163). According to defendant, Ms. Hunter asked him
if he would help her cash a check (T. 169). They went to the
home of defendant's mother to cash the check (T. 169). She could
not cash the check (T. 170). Defendant then suggested Ms. Hunter
could cash the check at Check Mart (T. 171).
-5-

Upon leaving his mother's house, defendant next claims
that Ms. Hunter dropped a checkbook on the lawn that he picked up
and put in the waistband of his pants (T. 171).
Defendant went to Check Mart with Ms. Hunter, but
denied making any statements to the teller (T. 175). Defendant's
testimony also contradicted the testimony of the arresting
officer; he denied hiding the checkbook in the waistband of his
pants (T. 197).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly ruled, on defendant's motion
in limine, that evidence of a prior conviction for attempted
forgery was admissible to impeach credibility.

Forgery is a

crime involving dishonesty or false statement, and is
automatically admissible pursuant to Utah R. Evid 609(a)(2).
Crimes that fall within the ambit of 609(a)(2) are not subject to
the general balancing provision of Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1) or
403.

Crimes involving dishonesty or false statement are always

admissible for impeachment purposes.
Defendant has failed to preserve for appeal a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct, as he failed to make a timely and
specific objection at trial.

The statement was not of such a

character that it could be considered plain error.

Therefore,

this Court should refuse to consider the issue on appeal.
Alternatively, the innocuous statement of the prosecutor was not
probably used by the jurors in making their decision.
The evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant
was guilty of forgery.
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prior attempted forgery conviction was allowed under subsection
(2), as a crime invloving dishonesty or false statement.

Trial

counsel attempted to classify the forgery conviction as a theft
or robbery offense, which would not fall within the ambit of 609
(a)(2)* (Transcript of Hearing [hereinafter T.H.] 7, 8). The
trial court correctly ruled that forgery does not fit into this
classification.

The trial judge recognized that forgery is a

crime involving deception, and bears directly on the accused's
propensity to testify truthfully (T.H. 9).
While this Court has not directly ruled on whether
forgery is a crime involving dishonesty or false statement it has
noted that "Utah's Rule 609 is the federal rule verbatim and
advised that federal case law should be consulted for advice in
interpreting the rule."

State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 17 (Utah

App. 1988), citing State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah
1986).
In United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.
1976), the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court ruling that
two forgery convictions were not admissible for impeachment
purposes.

Judge Kennedy held that M[t]hese convictions should

. . . have been admitted to impeach Porter.

Since forgery is a

crime involving 'dishonesty or false statement', see e.g. United
States v. DiLorenzo, 429 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1970), cert, denied,
402 U.S. 950, 91 S.Ct. 1609, 29 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971), and since the
convictions were less than ten years old, their admissiblity at
the trial is governed by Rule 609(a)(2)."

Dixon at 1083.
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1
By the phrase M dishonesty and false
statement" the Conference means crimes such
as perjury or subornation of perjury, false
statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or
false pretense, or any other offense in the
nature of crimen falsi, the commission of
which involves some element of deceit,
untruthful ness- nr f«iRj f{cat J on bearing c 1 1

the accused's propensity to testify
truthfully. H.R.Conf.Rep.No. 93-1597, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974]
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 7098,7103.
Id. at 362.

Crimen falsi is a creature of Roman law originated

to curtail the practice of forging, altering or destroying wills.
The term was later expanded to include every species of fraud and
deceit.

Jd. at 362 n.26.

Crimen falsi at common law was "any

crime which rendered the perpetrator incompetent to be a witness,
such as forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury and other crimes
affecting the administration of justice."
335 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).

Black's Law Dictionary

Aside from perjury, it is

hard to think of a crime which more directly bears on the
veracity of an individual to testify truthfully than does
forgery.
Defendant next argues that according to Wight,
609(a)(1) must be applied if the trial court does not make an
inquiry into the facts of the prior conviction.
incorrect.

This is

As the State reads Wight, an inquiry into the facts

is at the discretion of the court.

In Wight no inquiry was made

into the facts of a robbery conviction to determine if dishonesty
or false statement was present.

Since the court determined that

robbery is not a crime of dishonesty or false statement, the
court applied 609(a)(1).

The characteristics of some crimes are

such that this type of inquiry becomes unnecessary.

In those

cases, "Congress has substituted its judgment that evidence of
such crimes is always sufficiently related to credibility to
justify its admission."

Smith at 358-9. Any type of fraudulent

activity would fall under this rubric, including forgery.
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Should the Court decide to evaluate the prior conviction under
subsection (1) of Rule 609# the Banner test becomes applicable.
Pursuant to Banner the following five factors need to be
considered in deciding whether evidence of prior convictions is
more probative than prejudicial:
[1] The nature of the crime,
as bearing on the character for veracity of the witness; [2 1 the
recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction; [3] the
similarity of the prior crime to the charged crime, insofar as a
close resemblance may lead the jury to punish the accused as a
bad person; [4] the importance of credibility issues in
determining the truth in a prosecution tried without the decisive
nontestimonial evidence; and [5] the importance of the accused's
testimony, as perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions
probative of the accused's character for veracity. In the
instant case, application of the five factors would still weigh
in favor of admitting evidence of the prior conviction,
Admittedly, the third factor would weigh against admission.
However, this factor alone is insufficient to conclude that in
admitting the evidence, the trial court so abused its discretion
that "there is a 1 tkelihood that injust j ce resulted.*

B. Evidence offered under Rule 609(a)(2) is
not subject to the general balancing
provision of Rule 403.
All federal circuits that have ruled on this specific
question have held that the courts have no discretion to exclude,
as unduly prejudicial, evidence that a witness had been
previously convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or false
statement.

Given the plain language of rule 609(a)(2), and the

clear record of legislative intent, this interpretation is
correct.

Defendant would disregard these prior decisions, even

though this Court has found that "federal case law should be
consulted for advice in interpreting the rule."

Wight at 16,

citing Banner at 1333-34.
Utah R. Evid. 403 is a general rule "designed as a
guide for the handling of situations for which no specific rules
have been formulated."

See United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d

349, 354 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory
committee note).

Rule 403 was not designed to override more

specific rules, such as 609(a).

Ici. See also United States v.

Wong, 703 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1983), cert, denied 464 U.S 842
(1983); United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert, denied 449 U.S 985 (1980); United States v. Levya, 659 F.2d
118 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied 454 U.S. 1156 (1982).

-General

language of a statutory provision, although broad enough to
include it, will not be held to apply to a matter specifically
dealt with in another part of the same enactment.

Specific terms

prevail over the general in the same or another statute which
otherwise might be controlling."

Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285

U.S. 204, 208 (1932) (citations ommitted).
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revisions in both the House and the Senate.

It is to one of

these early drafts that Representative Lott's comments would seem
to apply.

Clearly, the final version of the rule does not allow

evidence of all prior felony convictions.

The legislative

history also points to an early version of the rule which
included a subsection (3), which would have explicitly granted
trial judges discretion to exclude evidence of crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement if they determined that their
probative value was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial
effect.

See Kiendra at 354, 355; Wong at 67. This test is
2

identical to Rule 403.

If Congress had intended this test to

apply to crimes involving dishonesty or false statement, this
provision would have remained. The Kiendra court points out:
Rule 609(a) received extensive scrutiny in
both chambers of Congress and underwent many
modifications before the final compromise was
struck in Conference Committee.
Significantly, none of the six different
proposals that were suggested by different
committees, subcommittees and full houses
called for the restoration of paragraph 3
from the Revised Draft.
Id. at 355 (footnote omitted).
Like every other court to consider this question, this
Court should be "driven by the force of explicit statutory
language and legislative history to hold that evidence offered
under Rule 609(a)(2) is not subject to the general balancing
provision of Rule 403."

.Id. at 354.

1. The Advisory Committee's note described proposed section
609(a)(3) as Ha particularized application" of Rule 403. Kiendra
at 355, n.3, citing 51 F.R.D. 315, 393 (1971).
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Q [By the prosecutor] And how did you feel
about that when you were in there, "i < I'IHII they
took your son?
A [By Ms. Hunter] When they took my son and
my son saw them put handcuffs on me and they
took him to the Detention Center, I was
extremely angry, I felt so stupid and so
so stupid for trying to help him. I just
did. I just can't believe that he would just
let me take my son there, just let me take my
son there like that.
Rueben, why did you. do that?
[Defense counsel] I ask that the witness
be admonished to answer the questions and
not —
The Witneeni 1
II iii n o r r y , 1* a p o l o g i z e ,
~
«I t a k n n m i n u t e t o calm dowuiii
(Weep-

rA4

-lb-

%

this

[Prosecutor] I was going to say the
State has no further questions at this time,
your Honor. Miss Hunter has recently had a
death in her family and I wonder if we could
have a recess.
The Court: Court will be in recess.
Remember the admonishment, ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, don't talk to each
other or anyone else about this case, don't
form any opinions or do any investigating. I
will have Mr. Tingey come and bring you back
when it is time to return.
(Recess taken.)
(T. 33-34.)
The innocuous comment of the prosecutor does not fall
within the plain error exception of rule 103(d).

For a finding

of plain error two requirements must be met:
(1) That the error be "plain", i.e., from
our examination of the record, we must be
able to say that it should have been obvious
to a trial court that it was committing error
and;
(2) That the error affect the substantial
rights of the accused, i.e., that the error
be harmful. . . .
State v. Eldredqe, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 18 (Utah Feb. 1, 1989)
(citations ommittted) (footnote omitted).

Defendant fails to meet either prong of the Eldredge
requirement.

First, it is not clear to the State at this point

that the prosecutor's statement constituted error of any kind.
The statement was made when the prosecutor was requesting a
recess in order for the witness to compose herself.

Defendant

claims that the prosecutor made this statement in an attempt to
garner sympathy for the witness.

It appears that the prosecutor

would have elicited more sympathy for the defendant if she had
allowed the emotional outburst of the witness to go unexplained.
In the context of the trial, the jury would have assumed the
witness was crying solely because she had been used by the
defendant.

In any case, the error would clearly not have been

obvious to a trial court.
Evaluation of the second requirement becomes
unnecessary, as the statement was not "plain" error.
Nevertheless, the error did not have a substantial impact on the
verdict.

The prosecutor's statement that the witness had a death

in the family added nothing to the credibility of the witness.
If, as defendant claims, the essence of this case involved the
question for the jury as to which witness was more believable, a
statement which might elicit sympathy for a witness would add
nothing to their credibility.

Because the alleged error does not

fall witin the ambit of rule 103(d) this court should refuse to
consider the issue.
Should the Court decide to reach the merits of this
claim,

State v. Valdez, 30 Utah2d 54, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973)

established the rule governing reversals for improper statements
of counsel:
The test of whether the remarks made by
counsel are so objectionable as to merit
reversal in a criminal case is, did the
remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified in
considering in determining their verdict, and
were they, under the circumstances of the
particular case, probably influenced by those
remarks•

-17-

While a death in the witness' family is not relevant to the
issues, it is not something that is contemplated by the first
prong (jurors would not be "justified" in considering fact) of
the Valdez test.

However, arguably, the jury would not be

justified in considering a death in the witness' family, in
determining their verdict.
test has not been met.

Nevertheless, the second prong of the

Under the circumstances of this case, the

jurors were probably not influenced by the remarks of the
prosecutor.

Defendant's contention seems to be that the

statement was made in an attempt to inflame the jury.

Given the

innocuous nature of the statement this argument is untenable.
Defendant goes on to claim that the statement had a greater
impact "because it was presented to the jurors as if it were an
accepted fact, without giving Mr. Ross the opportunity to crossexamine the witness" (A.B. 22). The State is uncertain how this
would give the statement greater impact, nor what crossexamination would have revealed.

Defendant also ignores the fact

that defense counsel cross-examined the witness directly after
the recess.

This Court should find that under the circumstances

of this case that the jurors were not influenced by the comments
of the prosecutor.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT DEFENDANT'S GUILT
OF FORGERY.
Defendant claims that the evidence produced at trial
was insufficient to convict of forgery.

The Utah Supreme Court

pointed out in State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), that

when a defendant claims the evidence is insufficient to sustain
his conviction, and appellate court should limit the scope of its
review.
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the
light most favorable to the verdict of the
jury. We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence,
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted. State v. Petree, Utah, 659
P.2d 443, 444 (1983); accord State v.
McCardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982).
In reviewing the conviction, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
M
It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses...." State v.
Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); accord
State v. Linden, Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366
(1983). So long as there is some evidence,
including reasonable inferences, from which
findings of all the requisite elements of the
crime can be made, our inquiry stops. . . .
Id. at 345.

This Court has also succinctly stated that unless

there is a clear showing by the appellant of lack of evidence,
the jury verdict will be upheld.

State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d

410, 412 (Utah App. 1987); State v. One 1982 Silver Honda
Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392, 393-94 (Utah App. 1987).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1978), sets out the elements
of forgery.

This section provides in pertinent part:

76-6-501. Forgery—-Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with
purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge
that he is facilitating a fraud to be
perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) Alters any writing of another without
his authority or utters and such altered
writing; or
(b) Makes, completes, executes,
outhenticates, issues, transfers,
•19-

publishes, or utters any writing so that
the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance,
transferrrence, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another,
whether the person is existent or
nonexistent.
•

• . .

(3) Forgery is a felony of the second
degree if the writing is or purports to be:
. . . .

(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or
more....
The evidence in this case is sufficient to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that with the intent to defraud Check
Mart, defendant issued a check, purported to be signed by James
Quigley, to Jeannie Hunter for $200.00.
Defendant met Ms. Hunter at a convenience store on July
9, 1988 (T. 14). He enlisted her help in cashing a check which
he claimed was from his grandmother (T. 19). Defendant gave Ms.
Hunter a check which had been stolen the night before.

The check

was made out Ms. Hunter for $200.00 and had two forged signatures
on the front (T. 5, 6, 24). Defendant accompanied Ms. Hunter to
Check Mart to cash the check.

While entering the building,

defendant encouraged Ms. Hunter to misrepresent that the checking
account was in the name of her grandparents.

When questioned by

the teller, defendant claimed that it was from his grandmother.
Defendant bases his claim on conflicting testimony.

As

stated above, where the testimony conflicts, "it is the exclusive
function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses."

State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231.

The evidence supports the jury's conclusion that defendant was
guilty of forgery.

The evidence was not so insubstantial or

lacking that a reasonable person would not have reached a guilty
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 412.

CONCLUSION
The defendant, Rueben Ross, was properly convicted of
forgery, a second degree felony.

For the foregoing reasons, and

any additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the State of
Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's
conviction.
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